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The World, through the Judge’s Eye 
Katharine G Young∗
I.  Introduction 
How should the constitution of a democracy address the world? How should its 
constituent actors — its legislators, its administrators and its judges — react to 
legal developments that have taken place elsewhere? For legislators, the choice 
seems clear — no country is unaffected by outside developments, and the content 
of legislation can, and should, be influenced by legal and other change. For judges, 
however, the alternatives are differently cast. Is their choice to resist the influence 
of non-national law, or else engage with it as a body of law containing methods of 
reasoning and results that are sometimes persuasive, sometimes irrelevant, and 
sometimes positively aversive to Australian law?1 How should judges perceive the 
world, and what is special about their perception? In other words, what is the 
world, through the judge’s eye? 
The irony of these questions is that engagement with the world helps to provide 
an answer. Constitutional judges around the world have shown themselves to be 
open to considering legal developments elsewhere, and openly expressive about 
that fact. They are looking beyond the familiar sources of constitutional 
interpretation — written text and structure, founding debates and history, and 
perhaps national values or experience — to norms developed in foreign case law, 
international instruments and even international institutions. 2  The question, in 
other constitutional systems at least, is no longer whether to engage with non-
national law, but how. 
For the past twenty years, while these developments seemed to barely touch the 
Australian antipodes, Michael Kirby has wanted us to see our law in international 
                                            
∗  BA/LLB (Hons) (Melb), LLM (Harv), SJD (Harv); Centre for International 
Governance and Justice, Regulatory Institutions Network, Australian National 
University. My thanks to Hilary Charlesworth, Susan Harris Rimmer, Frank 
Michelman, Adam Shinar and Margaret Young for helpful comments on prior drafts. 
1  For a description of these attitudes, with respect to comparative law, see K Lane 
Scheppele, ‘Aspirational and Aversive Constitutionalism: The Case for Studying 
Cross-Constitutional Influence through Negative Models’, (2003) 1 International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 296; V Jackson, ‘Constitutional Comparisons: 
Convergence, Resistance, Engagement’, (2005) 119 Harvard Law Review 109. See 
also V Jackson, 'Transnational Challenges to Constitutional Law: Convergence, 
Resistance, Engagement; (2007) 35 Federal Law Review 161. 
2  For example, Roper v Simmons, 543 US 551 (2006) (United States); S v Makwanyane 
1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (South Africa); R v Ewanchuk [1999] 1 SCR 330 (Canada); 
Apparel Export Promotion Council v AK Chopra [1999] All India Reporter (S.C.) 625 
(India). 
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terms. He has wanted us, that is, to engage in a kind of worldly thought experiment 
by imagining that, through the power of judicial knowledge — and judicial 
dialogue — about world history, present global practices, and indeed the very 
future of the planet, the Australian legal system can be made more justifiably our 
own. His advancement of an international lens — of seeing Australian law through 
‘the world’s eye’ 3  — includes reference to international law, encompassing 
resolutions and treaties made by states within the United Nations system, especially 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,4 and the decisions of international 
tribunals and committees established under treaty law. His lens also includes 
reference to comparative law, expanding his reference list from the traditional 
English Law Reports, beyond even the United States opinions which permeate 
other opinions in Australia, to caselaw and legislation from jurisdictions as diverse 
as Canada, Germany, Hong Kong, India, Israel, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand and 
South Africa. Indeed, his lens blurs the very division between international and 
comparative law. 
It is not that Kirby, the recently retired Australian High Court Justice best 
known for his defense of judicial activism,5 his prolific legal contribution,6 and his 
record-breaking term of office,7 has moved closer to the world. The world has 
moved closer to Kirby. It has provided him with a situation in which his bold 
dissents have become persuasive (international) authority, his outlier interpretations 
have been bolstered by likeminded judicial examples elsewhere, and his own 
position in the Australian legal system — laggard, in world terms, in the 
transjudicial constitutional conversation at least — has given him leadership status. 
In essence, Kirby J’s interpretive principle — which advocated the use of 
international law as a guide in common law development, statutory interpretation, 
and, most controversially, in constitutional interpretation — has scrambled the 
categories of minority and majority opinions, of the legal communities in which 
orthodoxies become heresies and heresies become orthodoxies, and of the 
professional timelines and geographic spaces in which loners become leaders.8  
                                            
3  Justice M Kirby, Through the World’s Eye (2000), (speeches selected and edited by 
C Sampford, S Blencowe and S Condlln), xxv.  
4  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G A Res 217A (III), U N Doc A/810 
(10 December 1948). 
5  See, eg, Justice M Kirby, Judicial Activism: Authority, Principle and Policy in the 
Judicial Method (2004) 25 (reclaiming the term with the rhetorical question ‘Where 
else … did the common law and the principles of equity come from, if it was not from 
judicial activity?’).  
6  See the nearly 1000-page collection, I Freckelton and H Selby (eds), Appealing to the 
Future: Michael Kirby and His Legacy (2009). 
7  Serving from 1983 to 2009 in the Federal Court of Australia, New South Wales Court 
of Appeal, and High Court of Australia. During that time, he also held numerous 
international posts, including Special Representative of the Solicitor-General of the 
United Nations for Human Rights in Cambodia, President of the International 
Commission of Jurists, and membership of the Ethics Committee of the Human 
Genome Organisation, London. 
8  Two commentators have suggested that Kirby J sought vindication from subsequent 
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These categories have been complicated, expanded, and sped up, by globalisation. 
As Justice Heydon of the High Court of Australia recently instructed us, twenty-
one Justices who have considered the influence of international law on the 
Australian Constitution (specifically in affecting legislative powers) have denied it; 
only one has affirmed it.9 And yet Kirby — who might easily have remained in the 
defensive rearguard within a changing High Court (his term of office spanned the 
Mason Court, and the Brennan, Gleeson and French Courts that followed) — has 
become a leading advocate of an interpretive practice now inexorably part of the 
practice of judging in other parts of the world.  
II.  The World as Prism 
Justice Kirby advocated the virtues of seeing Australian law through the world’s 
eye.10 Yet we might understand the practice of looking outwards differently. The 
practice is one of judges seeing the world through their own judicial lens: a world 
of majorities and minorities, of tightly bounded rules of decision-making and of 
touchstone notions of authority, persuasiveness and relevance. The world, through 
the judge’s eye, is thus a place of sharp foregrounds and blurred backgrounds: of 
foregrounded law, legitimately presented and discussed, and of background 
extraneous material.  
In this manner, Kirby J did not reject the basic characteristics of judging. He 
drew support from the conventional tasks of the judicial role — of careful 
consideration of text, structure, and precedent, and — what will be important to 
this analysis — of the fundamental importance of giving reasons.11 In addition, he 
marshalled the examples of another Australian High Court Justice who had drawn 
on international law in interpretation, including in constitutional cases: Justice 
Murphy had considered the relevance of developments in international law in 
interpreting the scope of the external affairs power12 — a view that ultimately 
                                                                                                     
generations of High Court Justices and from the people of Australia. My thesis is that 
his audience is much larger, and is of the present: cf Gavan Griffith and Graeme Hill, 
‘Constitutional Law: Dissents and Posterity’ in I Freckelton SC and H Selby (eds), 
Appealing to the Future: Michael Kirby and His Legacy (2009) 217, 237–38.  
9  Roach v Electoral Commissioner [2007] HCA 43, [181] (Heydon J) (noting those who 
have denied ‘[t]he proposition that the legislative power of the Commonwealth is 
affected or limited by developments in international law since 1900’). Kirby J may 
indeed have been in the minority, as the Court is presently constituted, however 
Justice Heydon’s counting is, with respect, incorrect. Other members of the Court have 
certainly viewed the legislative power with respect to external affairs as affected by 
developments in post-1900 international law, although this power was not treated as 
limited by international law: compare Horta v The Commonwealth (1994) 181 CLR 
183 with cases cited below n 12. 
10  Kirby, above n 3, xxv. 
11  Justice M Kirby, ‘Reasons for Judgment: “Always Permissible, Usually Desirable”’ 
(1994) 12 Australian Bar Review 121; see also Justice M Kirby, ’Appellate Reasons’ 
(2007) 30 Australian Bar Review 3. 
12  Dowal v Murray (1978) 143 CLR 410 (noting the relevance of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights to the external affairs power in s 51(xxix), as a supplementary source 
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prevailed. 13  Kirby J also drew support from judges (and their judgments) 
elsewhere, such as Lord Cooke of Thorndon, then President of the New Zealand 
Court of Appeal,14 and members of the Canadian Supreme Court15 and the United 
States Supreme Court. 16  He was influenced — indeed, he describes it as an 
‘epiphany’17 — by a conference in 1988, in Bangalore, India, at which common 
law judges such as former Chief Justice P N Bhagwati from the Indian Supreme 
Court, and Justice Ginsburg, now of the United States Supreme Court, were 
present.18 By the end of this conference, the judges had together formed a set of 
principles to guide their work. Included in these ten principles was the following:  
                                                                                                     
to support the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), along with the marriage power in s 51(xxi); 
see also Koowarta v Bjelke-Peterson (1982) 153 CLR 168, 237 (interpreting the 
external affairs power as support for the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth); see 
also at 217 (Stephens J) noting ‘the content of [the external affairs power] lies very 
much in the hands of the community of nations of which Australia forms a part’. 
Murphy was the first to note the importance of the United Nations human rights 
instruments, but earlier cases had upheld other laws enacted on the basis of 
multilateral instruments: Roche v Kronheimer (1921) 29 CLR 329 (Higgins J) 
(upholding legislative implementation of the Treaty of Peace signed at Versailles after 
World War I on basis of external affairs); see also R v Burgess; Ex parte Henry (1936) 
55 CLR 608. In recording his debt to Murphy, Kirby concedes that he himself once 
found the use of international law ’heretical’: see Kirby, ‘The Power of Lionel 
Murphy’s Ideas’, in Kirby, Through the World’s Eye, above n 3, 127, 137–38; Cf Al-
Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562, 589 [63] (McHugh J) (using the same language 
to denounce the practice), described below n 63. 
13  Commonwealth v Tasmania (‘The Tasmanian Dams Case’) (1983) 158 CLR 1 (a 
matter of international concern); see also Victoria v Commonwealth (‘Industrial 
Relations Act Case’) (1996) 187 CLR 416. For an overview of the use of international 
law in other constitutional cases, see K Walker, ‘International Law as a Tool of 
Constitutional Interpretation’ (2002) 28 Monash University Law Review 85 (including 
an analysis of the influence of international law on the interpretation of Ch III of the 
Constitution, the implied freedom of political communication, and s 44). For a list of 
specifically human rights arguments — comparative, historical, and/or international — 
see F E Johns, ‘Human Rights in the High Court of Australia, 1976-2003: The 
Righting of Australian Law?’, (2005) 33 Federal Law Review 287, 322 (Appendix) 
(List One) 
14  Kartinyeri v Commonwealth (‘Hindmarsh Island Bridge Case’) (1998) 195 CLR 337, 
417 (Kirby J), citing Tavita v Minister of Immigration [1994] 2 NZLR 257, 266 
(Cooke P). 
15  Kartinyeri v Commonwealth (1998) 195 CLR 337, 417 (Kirby J). 
16  Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Ame 
(2005) 218 ALR 483, 517–19 (citing Roper v Simmons, 543 US 551 (2006)); see also 
Re Colonel Aird; Ex parte Alpert (2004) 220 CLR 308, fn 152 (Kirby J) (citing Atkins 
v Virginia 536 US 304, 316 (2002), Lawrence v Texas 539 US 558, 572–73, 576–77 
(2003) (Kennedy J)). 
17  Justice M Kirby, ‘To Judge Is to Learn’ (2007) 48 Harvard International Law Journal 
Online 36, 38. 
18  For his recollection of prominent participants, see Justice M Kirby, ‘The Growing 
Rapprochement between International Law and National Law’, in G Sturgess and 
A Anghie (eds), Visions of the Legal Order in the 21st Century: Essays to Honour His 
Excellency Judge C J Weeramantry <www.hcourt.gov.au/speeches/kirbyj/ 
kirbyj_weeram.htm>. 
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1. Fundamental human rights and freedoms are inherent in all 
humankind and find expression in constitutions and legal systems 
throughout the world and in the international human rights 
instruments. 
2. These international human rights instruments provide important 
guidance in cases concerning fundamental human rights and 
freedoms. 
3. There is an impressive body of jurisprudence, both international and 
national, concerning the interpretation of particular human rights and 
freedoms and their application. This body of jurisprudence is of 
practical relevance and value to judges and lawyers generally. 
4. In most countries whose legal systems are based upon the common 
law, international conventions are not directly enforceable in 
national courts unless their provisions have been incorporated by 
legislation into domestic law. However, there is a growing tendency 
for national courts to have regard to these international norms for the 
purpose of deciding cases where the domestic law — whether 
constitutional, statute or common law — is uncertain or  
incomplete. …19
In short, the Bangalore Principles heralded the fact of, and judicial approval for, 
a transnational judicial dialogue.20 They also provided it with a normative theory: 
the practice was welcomed ‘because it respects the universality of fundamental 
human rights and freedoms and the vital role of an independent judiciary in 
reconciling the competing claims of individuals and groups of persons with the 
general interests of the community.’21 The dialogue that is established incorporates 
a practice of referring to foreign caselaw, including the work of international 
tribunals, in considering domestic law. For international law scholars, this practice 
suggests an ever-closer connection between international and domestic law, 
                                            
19  The Bangalore Principles were released as a summary of issues discussed at a Judicial 
Colloquium on ‘The Domestic Application of International Human Rights Norms’, 
held in Bangalore, India from 24–26 February 1988. Reprinted in Commonwealth 
Secretariat, Developing Human Rights Jurisprudence: The Domestic Application of 
International Human Rights Norms, vol 1, (1998) ix-x and in (1989) 1 African Journal 
of International and Comparative Law/ Revue Africaine de Droit International et 
Comparé 345. The principles are also appended to an early and comprehensive 
discussion by Justice Kirby, in ‘The Role of the Judge in Advancing Human Rights by 
Reference to International Human Rights Norms’ 62 (1988) Australian Law Journal 
514, 531. 
20  While the forum at Bangalore might have been one of the first, subsequent judicial 
conferences have been hosted by US law schools, through ‘outreach’ by the Office of 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights, and through the Commonwealth network: 
see Justice M Kirby, ‘Transnational Judicial Dialogue, Internationalisation of Law and 
Australian Judges’ (2008) 9 Melbourne Journal of International Law 171, 173–80 
(providing a summary of the various venues).  
21  Kirby, ‘The Role of the Judge’, above n 19. 
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bringing to fruition a long-hoped for source of enforcement for a notoriously 
under-enforced body of law.22  
For domestic lawyers, too, many of the connections between the two bodies of 
law make sense, at least on conventional rule of law principles. That is, once the 
Australian government has ratified a treaty, the treaty should inform the judicial 
interpretation of Australian legislation, on the theory that Australia should be 
presumed to have enacted law in compliance with its international obligations.23 
Of course, if express statutory words depart from those obligations, they override 
the presumption. A similar theory has been held to legitimate recourse to treaties in 
administrative decision-making. 24 Further support for judicial recourse to 
international law comes from the principle of legality — or the ‘fundamental rights 
principle’ — which requires that parliament use clear and unambiguous language 
to interfere with fundamental rights of the common law, and the ‘legitimate 
influence’ principle, which allows that international law may guide common law 
development. 25  (For international custom, where the laws are arguably less 
accessible to domestic judges than treaty law, these broad rule of law principle 
raises additional complications.)26
It is in the realm of constitutional interpretation that the interpretive principle is 
most controversial.27 Those resisting the use of international law in constitutional 
interpretation see one (or more) of many dangers to the integrity of our 
constitutional system. First, they may stress the threat of ‘empire’. The threat of a 
new imperialism is the idea that our independent Constitution, wrested from British 
legal control,28 is now to be controlled by a different set of powerful countries 
                                            
22  For example, H Hongju Koh, ‘International Law as Part of Our Law’ (2004) 98 
American Journal of International Law 43, 56 (celebrating a ’transnational legal 
process’ through which ‘interlinked rules of domestic and international law develop, 
and … interlinked processes of domestic and international compliance come about’). 
23  Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration (1992) 176 CLR 1, 38; See further the 
propositions in Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade v Magno (1992) 112 ALR 529, 
534–5 (Gummow J); Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476, [27]–
[34] (Gleeson CJ).  
24  Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273; but see Re 
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Lam (2003) 214 CLR 1. 
25  Coco v R (1994) 179 CLR 427, 437 (fundamental rights); Mabo v Queensland (No 2) 
(1992) 175 CLR 1, 42 (legitimate influence). For an analysis of the present operation 
of these principles, see Wendy Lacey, Implementing Human Rights Norms: Judicial 
Discretion and Use of Unincorporated Conventions (2008).  
26  For example, Polyukhovich v Commonwealth (1991) 172 CLR 501, [65]. Less 
accessible, but not impossible: the test for ascertaining customary international law 
parallels the work of a domestic tribunal: compare Paquete Habana; The Lola, 175 US 
677 (1900) with Statute of the International Court of Justice, art 38(1)(b); Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of 
America), Merits, Judgment, (1986) ICJ Reports, 14. 
27  The mainstream resistance to international law is well-presented by the following 
statement: AMS v AIF (1999) 199 CLR 160, 180 (the Constitution’s provisions ‘are 
not to be construed as subject to an implication said to be derived from international 
law’) (footnote omitted) (Gleeson CJ, McHugh and Gummow JJ).  
28  For a recognition that sovereignty resides with the Australian people, and not the 
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which now set the international agenda: an agenda which this country, as a Western 
middle-power, may influence, but surely does not control. 29  The ‘democratic 
deficit’ that attends the introduction of these laws is exacerbated by the fact that it 
is the executive, rather than the legislature, that has the power to ratify.30 Only 
resistance prevents the subservience of the Australia people — via their 
constitutional document — to the more powerful legal practitioners of the more 
powerful states and hence the more powerful laws they are able to devise.31  
Second, is the reverse threat of ‘vacuum’. This is the threat that international 
law presents no constraint on the development of Australian constitutional law. The 
threat of the vacuum expresses the fear, always present in constitutional law 
(which, because of its capacity to override simple majoritarian control, vests 
considerable power in judges32), that judges can cherry-pick what to take from the 
                                                                                                     
Imperial Parliament, see Australia Act 1986 (Cth); see also Australian Capital 
Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106, 138 (Mason CJ).  
29  For a description of the sites of lawmaking, from colonial forums to international 
forums, from a ‘small commonwealth country perspective’, see J McLean, ‘From 
Empire to Globalization: The New Zealand Experience’ (2004) 11 Indiana Journal of 
Global Legal Studies 161. 
30  The fear of the ‘democratic deficit’, although expressed in similar terms in many 
constitutional systems, emerges from quite different institutional arrangements: see, 
eg, K G Young, ‘The Implementation of International Law in the Domestic Laws of 
Germany and Australia’ (1999) 21 Adelaide Law Review 177 (comparing the input of 
both state and federal parliaments in the decision to ratify a treaty). Australian reforms 
have led to a greater role for Parliament in both scrutinising treaties and in debating 
implementing legislation: Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee, 
Parliament of Australia, Trick or Treaty? Commonwealth Power to Make and 
Implement Treaties (1995); Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Attorney-General, 
Government Announces Reform of Treaty-Making (Media Release FA-29, 2 May 
1996) (http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/releases/1996/fa29.html). 
31  Indeed, the fear of empire has been expressed in the US, with respect to ‘foreign law’. 
For a rather extraordinary expression of this sentiment, see Congressman Ted Poe of 
Texas, calling attention to the patriots who “spilled their blood … to sever ties with 
England forever …. Now justices in this land of America … use British court 
decisions … in interpreting our Constitution. What the British could not accomplish by 
force, our Supreme Court has surrendered to them voluntarily”, 151 Congress Records 
H3105 (May 10, 2005). These statements have attended the resolutions in the US 
House of Representatives and Senate, where members of the Republican Party have 
proposed legislation to prohibit the Court from citing foreign materials: see 
Constitution Restoration Act of 2004, HR 3299, 108th Cong, 2d Sess (2004), and 
Constitution Restoration Act of 2005, S 520, 109th Cong, 1st Sess (2005). 
32  The canvassing of constitutional practice around the world indicates that this fear can 
be mediated through a variety of institutional forms: see, eg, Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, s 33 (override clause). The legislative protection 
of rights is another institutional mechanism which ultimately limits the judiciary in 
cases involving fundamental rights: see, eg, British Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), 
New Zealand Bill of Rights 1990 (NZ). Gardbaum has described these variations as 
models which limit judicial power while nevertheless protecting rights: S Gardbaum, 
‘The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism’ (2001) 49 American Journal 
of Comparative Law 707 (terming this a ‘Commonwealth’ model, but excluding 
Australia and other Commonwealth countries from the analysis). 
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world and use it to support their own idiosyncratic values.33 The vacuum exerts no 
influence: but only exacerbates the indeterminacy and discretion in the hands of the 
judge. Again, resistance is thought to protect against this, especially in relation to 
constitutional law.34 Other imagined threats to democracy — and local knowledge, 
community values, or judicial accountability — sound similar notes on these two 
themes.  
Justice Kirby saw things differently. The Constitution speaks not only to the 
Australian people, ‘who made it and accept it for their governance’, but ‘to the 
international community as the basic law of the Australian nation which is a 
member of that community’.35 A Constitution, therefore, faces two ways: inwards 
to its citizenry, its traditional demos, and outwards to the world. And the meaning 
of a Constitution is influenced by both audiences, especially in the case of 
‘universal and fundamental rights’. Thus, in extending the previous position 
expressed by Justice Brennan in Mabo,36 that international human rights law might 
be a legitimate influence on the common law, Kirby J suggested that international 
human rights law could influence the Australian Constitution. This was especially 
fitting, he suggested, in light of the fact that Australian constitutional law ‘may 
sometimes fall short of giving effect to fundamental rights’.37
Justice Kirby’s position appears to be a bold — even audacious — meta-
principle for the Australian Constitution: a ‘meta’ principle because it arguably 
changes the entire character of that document, rather than specific individual 
provisions.38 It was audacious in 1997 (a time closer to the highpoint of implied 
rights in the Australian Constitution promoted by the Mason Court39), and perhaps 
                                            
33  See, eg, the position taken by Roberts CJ in his criticism of the practice before the US 
Judicial Committee at his nomination, Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of 
John G Roberts, Jr to be Chief Justice of the United States Before the S Comm on the 
Judiciary, 109th Cong 200 (2005), 200–01 (statement of Judge John Roberts), (‘[In] 
foreign law, you can find anything you want.’); for a similar position, see Judge R 
Posner, How Judges Think (2008).  
34  Printz v United States, 521 US 898, 921 fn 11 (1997) (Scalia J). 
35  Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 513. 
36  Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1, 42. 
37  Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 513. 
38  For suggestions of its incompatibility with the current interpretive theories of the 
Australian Constitution, see A Simpson and G Williams, ‘International Law and 
Constitutional Interpretation’ (2000) 11 Public Law Review 205, 222 (suggesting a 
potential for conflict between the use of Convention Debates to resolve constitutional 
ambiguities, suggested by Cole v Whitfield (1988) 165 CLR 360, and recourse to 
current international law). For a suggestion that recourse to international law, if 
permissible, might follow a similar structure to the Convention Debates, see Roach v 
Electoral Commissioner [2007] HCA 43, [181] (Heydon J) (suggesting that the 
plaintiff should have presented information about the countries present on the Human 
Rights Committee at the relevant times of passage into international law, and the 
influence Australia had on the deliberations). 
39  For example, Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 
106 (involving the reliance, by a number of judges, on a constitutional implication of a 
freedom of communication, on the basis that the Australian Constitution was regarded 
as one bringing into existence a system of representative government). For a 
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all the more so a decade later. Yet it is, counter-intuitively, a position shared by 
many judges interpreting many constitutions around the world, and is becoming 
ever more widespread.  
Indeed, Kirby J’s interpretive principle maps partly onto the principles 
espoused by judges in other final courts. Some of these courts are interpreting post-
Second World War constitutions, which have borrowed textually and structurally 
from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and subsequent international 
covenants.40 Most recently, this practice has ignited controversy in relation to the 
United States Constitution, which of course precedes the international bill of rights 
by an even greater number of years than the Australian Constitution. 41  For 
example, United States Supreme Court Justices have used international sources to 
assist them in interpreting the constitutional prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishment in the Eighth Amendment, and the protection of sexual privacy in the 
substantive due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.42
We may distinguish these two examples — of the postwar paradigm and the 
United States paradigm — from the Australian Constitution on the grounds of 
‘genealogy’. The United States Bill of Rights itself influenced the drafting of the 
international human rights instruments, which has led to a ‘wise parent’ 
justification for the recourse by American judges to international law.43 On this 
theory, the U.S. Bill of Rights has indirectly generated a great deal of useful rights-
jurisprudence from around the world, from which its judges can learn. The postwar 
paradigm, on the other hand, allowed national constitutions to join the model of 
rights protection, once fundamental rights had been drafted in international 
                                                                                                     
discussion of the use of foreign law in developing this doctrine, including the caselaw 
of Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Court of Human 
Rights, see C Saunders, ‘The Use and Misuse of Comparative Constitutional Law’ 
(2006) 13 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 37. Saunders describes the greater 
utilisation of foreign law in cases involving new doctrine, as opposed to settled 
doctrine: ibid, 43.  
40  L E Weinrib, ‘The Postwar Paradigm and American Exceptionalism’ in S Choudhry 
(ed), The Migration of Constitutional Ideas (2006) 84, 89–98 (describing the 
framework of fundamental rights that followed the defeat of Nazism). 
41  For example, R P Alford, ‘Misusing International Sources to Interpret the 
Constitution’ (2004) 98 American Journal of International Law 57, 57–58  (suggesting 
that ‘[i]ncluding a new source fundamentally destabilises the equilibrium of 
constitutional decision making’, but nevertheless noting that, ‘Of course, this essay 
does not suggest that international sources should never be used as persuasive 
authority in certain types of constitutional analysis’, citing copyright protection as an 
example). 
42  For example, Roper v Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005); Lawrence v Texas 539 US 
558, 572–3, 576–77 (2003). 
43  United States v Then, 563 F 3d 464, 468–69 (2d Cir, 1995) (Calabresi J, concurring) 
(citing the approach of German and Italian constitutional courts to statutory 
interpretation in light of changed circumstances); Chief Justice M H Marshall, ‘Wise 
Parents Do Not Hesitate to Learn from Their Children: Interpreting State Constitutions 
in an Age of Global Jurisprudence’ (2004) 79 New York University Law Review 1633, 
1641 (presenting a justification for judges in state courts to take advantage of 
comparative constitutional law). 
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covenants. These constitutions benefited from the internationalised conversation on 
rights from the moment that they came into existence. The Australian Constitution 
is unlike both. It famously contains no comprehensive Bill of Rights. Justice Kirby 
therefore used other, non-genealogical, sources of justification for his interpretive 
principle. Before turning to these, and the forms of engagement that they promote, 
it is worth describing the transnational judicial community, in which Kirby J was in 
a (sort of) majority. 
III.  A New Plurality?  
Justice Kirby’s interpretive principle arguably creates a new plurality of judges, 
sourced outside of Australia. The principle itself is supported by many judges 
elsewhere. Moreover, the application of the principle opens up his decisions to a 
new body of legal support. This ‘global community of courts’ 44  has different 
parameters from the Australian High Court, from the Australian community of 
courts, and from the Australian legal community. Enlarging this community can 
lead to a different decision-making process, and sometimes a different result.  
For example, when the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the juvenile death 
penalty in Roper v Simmons, it did so after acknowledging ‘the overwhelming 
weight of international opinion’ against the punishment.45 Ultimately, the majority 
held that the penalty was contrary to the American constitutional prohibition on 
‘cruel and unusual’ punishment. 46  In understanding this provision, the U.S. 
Supreme Court had previously incorporated the importance of ‘evolving standards 
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society’.47 No other country in the 
world officially retained the death penalty for offenses committed by minors. This 
proved relevant to, if not determinative for, the test.48
One American scholar suggested that the use of non-U.S. law was a tool to 
‘swell the denominator’ against which the state jurisdictions retaining the juvenile 
death penalty were measured. 49  Ernest Young suggested that this made a 
significant proportion of American states — a twenty to thirty split — seem small 
and aberrant. Moreover, he criticised the way in which the focus on numbers taken 
by the majority, rather than on the substance of their reasons, lent an almost 
‘authoritative’ force to non-U.S. law.50 This criticism of numbers is not, at least in 
                                            
44  A Slaughter, ‘A Global Community of Courts’ (2003) 44  Harvard International Law 
Journal 191 (describing this phenomenon in terms of the relationships that it 
establishes).  
45  Roper v Simmons, 543 US 551, 578 (2005). 
46  United States Constitution, VIII Amt. 
47  Trop v Dulles, 356 US 86, 101 (1958). 
48  Roper v Simmons, 543 US 551, 578 (2005) (‘The opinion of the world community, 
while not controlling our outcome, does provide respected and significant 
confirmation for our own conclusions.’). 
49  E A Young, ‘Foreign Law and the Denominator Problem’ (2005) 119 Harvard Law 
Review 148. 
50  Ibid 151 (‘When a legal rule has force whether or not we agree with the reasons used 
to justify it, is that not the very definition of binding legal authority?’). 
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Young’s formulation, about numbers per se.51 Number-counting is central to the 
democratic credentials of the American constitutional system — majorities are of 
course proxies for democracy.52 It is the idea that some numbers — some opinions 
— should count beyond the traditional subjects of U.S. law. It is the fact that 
majorities become minorities, and vice versa, once the community is broadened.  
Justice Kirby’s (meta) interpretive principle performs a similar feat, except that 
it operates as a way in which to read all the terms of the Australian Constitution, 
and not only those invited by evaluative language, such as, in the American context 
‘cruel and unusual’53 (in which one Australian corollary might be ‘just terms’).54 
Justice Kirby’s principle operates — at least, as it is presently framed55 — in the 
case of ambiguous or vague language. The threshold of ambiguity does not seem to 
be a high one.56 Of course, this aspect of the principle means that a debate is 
generated about what the words might mean, rather than the perhaps more healthy 
debate about what values are at stake in the Constitution.  
Is Kirby J’s interpretive principle undemocratic? On at least two understandings 
of democracy, it may be the opposite. The first, presented by Eyal Benvenisti, is the 
idea that judges can bolster their own government’s ability to resist the influence of 
more powerful international participants by strategically selecting what sources of 
international law to rely on, and choosing those which enhance national democratic 
processes.57 This would make the use of international law especially applicable in 
the courts of a country of Australia’s size. In this justification, it is the forging of a 
‘united judicial front’ amongst courts, in regard to issues over which their own 
government’s ability to represent their people may be restricted, which helps 
                                            
51  See also Alford, above n 41, (describing this in terms of an ‘international 
countermajoritarian difficulty’, which expands the traditional tension represented by 
judges’ capacity to prevail over majorities in constitutional law).  
52  J Rubenfeld, ‘Unilateralism and Constitutionalism’ (2004) 79 New York University 
Law Review 1971 (distinguishing between a characteristically American preference for 
‘democratic constitutionalism’, and a European ‘international constitutionalism’). 
53  See further Koh, above n 22, 46, who notes the evaluative exercise invited by the 
words of ‘due process’, and ’unreasonable searches and seizures’.  
54  Australian Constitution, s 51(xxxi) (guaranteeing just terms for the acquisition of 
property); see Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 513 
(Kirby J); Commonwealth v Western Australia (1999) 196 CLR 392, [194] fn 205 
(Kirby J).  
55  In Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 513, fn 495, Kirby J 
left open the possibility that his interpretive principle might apply to non-ambiguous 
language. But see his rejection of international law in the case of clear statutory 
language in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v B 
(2004) 219 CLR 365, 426 [171] (Kirby J). 
56  Compare with Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 
273, 287 (Mason CJ and Deane J).  
57  Eyal Benvenisti, ‘Reclaiming Democracy: The Strategic Uses of Foreign and 
International Law by National Courts’ (2008) 102  American Journal of International 
Law 241, 259–62. Compare with D F Jackson, ‘Internationalisation of Rights and the 
Constitution’, in Robert French, Geoffrey Lindell and Cheryl Saunders (eds), 
Reflections on the Australian Constitution (2003) 105 (assessing the multiple ways in 
which globalization impacts on rights). 
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democracy.58 There is evidence that judges have applied independent review to 
their national government’s responses to issues such as counterterrorism and the 
status of asylum seekers: policies and laws whose content has been influenced 
heavily by other governments, rather than local actors. 59  The second, more 
ambitious, approach to understanding the transnational judicial dialogue in 
democratic terms is the idea that a new, global, demos has challenged the territorial 
boundaries in which the basic unit of democracy can be understood.60 From this 
cosmopolitan justification it would follow that seeking a new plurality of opinions 
is democratically legitimate, if the judges are sufficiently attune to the measures of 
political participation at the international level. Nonetheless, while the implications 
of a new, cosmopolitan, political order are highly relevant to the work of domestic 
judges, especially in national systems belonging to a regional system (most 
fittingly, Europe),61 Australian judges do not experience anything comparable to 
European integration. Moreover, nothing in Kirby J’s position expressly supports 
these particular conceptions of an internationally-responsive democracy, although 
he has elsewhere invoked a substantive conception of democracy, which 
incorporates a concern for minorities’ rights, and argues strongly for the role of 
non-majoritarian institutions in upholding democracy.62 For present purposes, we 
can ask instead a parallel question: is the interpretive principle unconstitutional?  
Clearly, there are many who consider that it is. Before his retirement from the 
High Court of Australia, Justice McHugh described the application of Kirby J’s 
interpretive principle to the Constitution as ‘heretical’. 63  In suggesting that 
indefinite detention (or, in formal terms, the continued detention of a person who 
cannot be practicably deported) was not inconsistent with the Australian 
Constitution,64 he emphatically rejected the relevance of international law to the 
interpretation of that instrument. For McHugh J, ‘If the [presumption] were 
                                            
58  Benvenisti, above n 57, 242.  
59  Ibid (providing examples of the judicial review of (coordinated) governmental 
responses in respect of counterterrorism measures, environmental protection in 
developing countries, and the status of asylum seekers in destination countries).  
60  Compare D Held, Democracy and the Global Order (1995) (suggesting that ‘the 
artificial person at the center of the modern state must be reconceived in terms of 
cosmopolitan public law’) with J Habermas, The Postnational Constellation 
(M Pensky trans, 2001 ed) [trans of: Die postnationale Konstellation (1998)]. In recent 
years, Held has also pulled back from a strong conception of cosmopolitan law: see, 
eg, D Held, Models of Democracy (3rd ed, 2006).   
61  See, eg, the survey of arguments in B Bryde, ‘International Democratic 
Constitutionalism?’ in R S J Macdonald and D M Johnston (eds), Towards World 
Constitutionalism (2005) 103–25.  
62  Justice M D Kirby, ‘The Impact of International Human Rights Norms: A Law 
Undergoing Evolution’ (1995) 25 The UWA Law Review 30, 43. This aspect is 
discussed in Simpson and Williams, above n 38, 223. 
63  Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562, 589 [63]. 
64  This was on the basis that the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) was within Commonwealth 
legislative power, and did not contravene the vesting of judicial power in Ch III of the 
Constitution. On the latter point, Gummow J registered his explicit dissent: Al-Kateb v 
Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562, 604–5 [110], see also Kirby J at 615 [146]. 
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applicable to a Constitution, it would operate as a restraint on the grants of power 
conferred. The Parliament would not be able to legislate in disregard of the 
implication.’65 Moreover,  
[i]f Australian courts interpreted the Constitution by reference to the rules of 
international law now in force, they would be amending the Constitution in 
disregard of the direction in s 128 of the Constitution. Section 128 declares that the 
Constitution is to be amended only by legislation that is approved by a majority of 
the States and ‘a majority of all the electors voting’.66  
At the same time as taking this position, McHugh J maintained an interpretive 
standpoint with respect to constitutional law that allowed for judges to take into 
account the ‘political, social and economic developments inside and outside 
Australia’ that have occurred since the Constitution’s enactment in 1900.67 (Justice 
McHugh thus provided a very broad description of the world, through the judge’s 
eye). Of course, to do otherwise might have put him off-side the independence 
understood to be gained by the Constitution by the passage of the Australia Acts in 
1986 (and would have thereby set him at odds with modern democratic 
principles).68 His objection that a ‘loose-leaf copy of the Constitution’69 would be 
required for judges following Kirby J’s interpretive principle does not cohere with 
his broader acceptance of the relevance of developments inside and outside of 
Australia. For McHugh J, coherence comes from drawing a sharp distinction 
between ‘rules’ of international law, that apply through the force of law, and non-
legal ‘developments’, that allow readers of the Constitution ‘to deduce propositions 
from the words of the Constitution that earlier generations did not perceive’.70 
Justice McHugh’s complaint resembles the ‘empire’, rather than ‘vacuum’ 
problem, described above, although he also shows how the two fears converge.  
In describing the binding force of international law, McHugh J noted that the 
High Court had earlier been informed that Australia was ‘a party to about 900 
treaties’, as well as bound by customary law and general principles of law.71 He 
complained that the body of international law is now much greater than it was at 
the Constitution’s founding. In this comment, McHugh J is expressing the threat of 
both empire and vacuum: empire, because of the sheer number of treaties binding 
on Australia; and vacuum, because the Minister had so lax a knowledge of what the 
executive had ratified. (McHugh J neglected to note the several important reforms 
to the treaty-making process in Australia since Teoh, as well as the fact that only a 
small fraction of this number would be relevant to any domestic dispute).72
                                            
65  Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562, 591 [66] (McHugh J). 
66  Ibid 592 [68]. 
67  Ibid 593 [68]. 
68  For example, Sue v Hill (1999) 199 CLR 462 (holding that a ‘foreign power’ for the 
purposes of s 44(i) of the Constitution includes the United Kingdom).  
69  Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562, [73] (McHugh J). 
70  Ibid 593 [69]. 
71  Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273, 316 
(McHugh J) (footnote omitted, emphasis added by McHugh J).  
72  For example, McHugh J did not comment on the establishment, in 1996, of (1) the 
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This returns us to the uses that are made by Kirby J of international law. Is he 
treating the sources of international law as binding authority, allowing Australia’s 
own Constitution to perform the commitments made by Australia internationally, 
and risking, as McHugh J would have it, the restraint on legislative power by an 
exercise of legislative power?73 Or is he instead treating international law in a 
different sense, acknowledging the importance of world legal opinion on the 
development of the fundamental rights of people in Australia? In order to respond 
to this question, it is helpful to turn to the justifications employed by Kirby J. I 
suggest that his justifications rely on rather conventional ideas about the judicial 
method, as well as three theories of the relationship between international law and 
the Constitution, some of which provide a sounder justification for his use of 
international law in the Australian context. 
IV.  Justifications of Method 
Two impulses of judicial method guide Kirby J’s interpretive principle. The 
first is the importance of giving reasons. If judges are influenced by a source, on 
their journey of reason to judgment, they should not hide that source.74 For Kirby 
J, as for all common law judges, it is important to express, on the record, the 
matters that have influenced the judge. The articulation of reasons promotes 
transparency in the legal process and the accountability of judges exercising 
judicial power. 75  A judge who reads about the decisions of international and 
comparative tribunals (and international treaties, and comparative legislation), finds 
them persuasive, and yet omits their consideration from the record of the opinion, 
would not be exercising judicial power transparently. Unlike judges in Japan, say, 
who have developed considerable expertise in relation to the U.S. Constitution, but 
withhold any mention of it from their decisions,76  this position advocates that 
material remains in the judgment, in order that the parties, subsequent lawyers and 
judges recognise the foundation on which the reasoning lies. This practice requires 
a wide reading if international law and opens up new challenges for the judicial 
                                                                                                     
parliamentary Joint Standing Committee on Treaties (JSCOT), (2) the Treaties Council 
comprising the Prime Minister, Premiers and Chief Ministers, (3) the requirement for a 
National Interest Analysis (NIA) for each treaty, (4) the requirement for at least 15 
sitting-days of the tabling in Parliament of treaties, and (5) the Australian Treaties 
Library: see Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee, above n 30; 
Minister for Foreign Affairs and Attorney-General, above n 30. For an overview, see, 
eg, H Charlesworth, M Chiam, D Hovell and G Williams, ‘Deep Anxieties: Australia 
and the International Legal Order’ (2003) 25 Sydney Law Review 423. 
73  See also Polites v The Commonwealth (1945) 70 CLR 60, 78 (Dixon J); Kartinyeri v 
Commonwealth (1998) 195 CLR 337, [98] (Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
74  Kirby, ‘Appellate Reasons’, above n 11, 19 (noting that the methods to ensure that 
petty interactions and rivalries, identified by Judge R Posner, do not inappropriately 
influence judging ‘include subjection of oneself to the discipline of expressing reasons 
as honestly and persuasively as one can’).  
75  Kirby, ‘Appellate Reasons’, above n 11, 6, citing Woolcock Street Investments Pty 
Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 515, [160]. 
76  See, eg, B Markesinis and J Fedtke, ‘The Judge as Comparatist’ (2005) 80 Tulane Law 
Review 121. 
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(and the litigant) role, particularly in appellate courts. Nonetheless, as the practice 
continues, appropriate techniques for arguing and distinguishing the persuasiveness 
of international law will develop.77  Litigants in Australia have already proven 
themselves willing to research and present arguments from international law, 
despite discouragement from the Court.78
The second clear motivation for Kirby J’s interpretive principle is the continuity 
between international law and comparative law.79 Rather than a new, novel, source 
of law, Kirby J has always stressed the consistency of his interpretive principle 
with the long-standing practice of looking elsewhere for guidance and inspiration 
on the development of Australian law. Moreover, the usefulness of international 
law signals not only continuity, but enhancement. Justice Kirby, who was schooled 
in the era of Privy Council appeals from Australian law, saw international law as a 
more modern source of influence on Australian law than English or Imperial law. 
80
This rationale stood out in 1988, while Kirby was still President of the New 
South Wales Court of Appeal. In a case examining the right to be tried without 
undue delay in Australia, Kirby P compared traditional foreign sources with the 
modern human rights principles of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights.81 Aside from his reference to the Magna Carta and the Habeas 
Corpus Act, he ‘did not find it useful, in such an important matter, to attempt to 
find and declare the common law of this State in 1988 by raking over the coals of 
English legal procedures of hundreds of years ago’.82 These procedures, which 
were ‘imperfectly known and subject to much scholarly controversy’, were 
unlikely to assist. ‘A more relevant source of guidance’, he suggested, ‘may be the 
modern statements of human rights found in international instruments, prepared by 
                                            
77  Simpson and Williams, above n 38, 217 (suggesting a ranking of international law 
according to their suitability for constitutional interpretation); cf A M Weisburd, 
‘Using International Law to Interpret National Constitutions — Conceptual Problems: 
Reflections on Justice Kirby’s Advocacy of International Law in Domestic 
Constitutional Jurisprudence’ (2006) 21 American University International Law 
Review 365, 374 (defending ‘a vital, active bar and legal academic community’, with 
minds trained on domestic law, as sufficient for providing feedback for judges).  
78  For example, Roach v Electoral Commissioner [2007] HCA 43, [181]. 
79  For an exploration of the comparative turn in international law, see K Knop, ‘Here and 
There: International Law in Domestic Courts’ (2000) 32 New York University Journal 
of International Law and Policy 501; L Amede Obiora, ‘Toward an Auspicious 
Reconciliation of International and Comparative Analyses’ 46 (1998) American 
Journal of Comparative Law 669.  
80  In this respect, Kirby J’s position suggests the modernism which, in Fleur Johns’ 
characterisation, is the predominant style of human rights discourse — and scholarship 
— in Australia. See Johns, ‘Human Rights in the High Court of Australia’, above n 13. 
See discussion of this categorisation at text accompanying n 140–142 below. 
81  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 
16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171. 
82  Jago v District Court of New South Wales (1988) 12 NSWLR 558, 569.  
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experts, adopted by organs of the United Nations, ratified by Australia, and now 
part of international law’.83 It is:  
at least as relevant to search for the common law of Australia applicable in this State 
with the guidance of a relevant instrument of international law to which this country 
has recently subscribed, as by reference to disputable antiquarian research 
concerning the procedures which may or may not have been adopted by the itinerant 
justices in eyre in parts of England in the reign of King Henry II.84
Thus, Kirby J’s interpretive principle was not simply that we should look to 
international law to improve the laws of Australia. It carried within it the much 
more profound point that we need to rid ourselves of the pervasive assumption that 
the English laws were necessarily the best ones for Australia. The clear implication 
is that international law does not replace English law as a new form of 
‘imprisonment’ for Australian legal development. On the contrary, judges are 
exhorted to look selectively across our borders in order to broaden Australian legal 
development, in constitutional law no less than elsewhere.  
V.  Justifications of Theory  
This continuity between domestic and international law has been lost to those 
advocating judicial isolation and resistance. Yet the continuity is striking. A rough 
analogy demonstrates the point. Comparative law in Australia was, in this legal 
system’s early years of development, a practice of ‘comparing’ local laws to assess 
their possible ‘repugnancy’ with Imperial enactments and their compatibility with 
the English common law. As the Australian legal system began to evolve to 
understand English law as ‘foreign law’, the practice of referring to a comparative 
legal system ceased to involve the question of bindingness. References to sources 
outside of the United Kingdom began to proliferate. Similarly, in the enterprise of 
transnational judicial dialogue, it is not the bindingness, or authority, of 
international law, that directs its use in domestic law. Domestic judges treat it as 
persuasive, only — as attracting adherence rather than obliging it.85 Nonetheless, 
there are gradations of this embrace. Three aspects of Kirby J’s approach are 
described here, which draw attention to different aspects of the persuasiveness of 
international law. These I term internationalism, worldliness and constitutionalism. 
These three aspects have received support by judges elsewhere: lending a circular 
justification to Kirby J’s own approach: that is, a justification for using world legal 
opinion that lies itself in world legal opinion.  
(a) The Internationalist Judge 
The internationalist judge defers to international law in decisions which also raise 
issues of domestic law. The starkest example of this position is the judge who does 
not differentiate between international treaties on the basis of their content. The 
                                            
83  Ibid. 
84  Ibid. 
85  See H Patrick Glenn, ‘Persuasive Authority’ (1987) 32 McGill Law Journal 261, 263–
64 (arguing that ‘choice of an external authority which effectively persuades is … in 
many cases more effective than adherence to binding, but unpersuasive, law’). 
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main source of the influence of international law is not its substance, then, but 
rather its authority as law. This is a ‘rule of law’ justification — or imperative — 
for the use of international law, in the sense that it requires that government is 
‘bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand’.86  
This is the use that provoked McHugh J’s criticism in Al-Kateb v Godwin.87 In 
taking aim at this aspect of Kirby J’s approach, McHugh J suggested that 
courts cannot read the Constitution by reference to the provisions of international 
law that have become accepted since the Constitution was enacted in 1900. Rules of 
international law at that date might in some cases throw some light on the meaning 
of a constitutional provision. …. But rules of international law that have come into 
existence since 1900 are in a different category.88
 McHugh J’s preference for freezing international law in its 1900 form is 
similar to the view espoused by Justice Scalia of the U.S. Supreme Court, that 
‘foreign law’ is inappropriate as a source of guidance in constitutional 
interpretation, (apart from very old English common law). 89  While it is 
unsurprising that Scalia J would take that position, in light of his consistent defense 
of originalism, it is more remarkable in McHugh J.90
Justice Kirby’s early invocation of international law suggests an internationalist 
standpoint. His initial pronouncements were premised on support for international 
law and an appreciation of the need for compliance with it. For example, in 
Newcrest Mining,91 in treating the right to property expressed in international law 
as relevant to the constitutional guarantee of just terms for the acquisition of 
property, 92  Kirby J relied on the arguably customary status of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. He went on to cite the Constitutions of the United 
States, India, Malaysia, Japan and South Africa, suggesting that these ‘do no more 
than reflect universal and fundamental rights by now recognised by customary 
                                            
86  R Bahdi, ‘Globalization of Judgment: Transjudicialism and the Five Faces of 
International Law in Domestic Courts’ (2002) 34 George Washington International 
Law Review 555, 560 (citing the rule of law justification presented by F A Hayek, The 
Road to Serfdom (1944) 72). 
87  Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562. 
88  Ibid 589 [62]. 
89  ‘The Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials in U.S. Constitutional Cases: A 
Conversation between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer’ (2005) 3  
International Journal of Constitutional Law 519. 
90  This is less the case for Callinan J: see, eg, Sue v Hill (1999) 73 ALJR 1016, 1077 
(Callinan J). Justice Callinan outlined this position in Western Australia v Ward 
(Miriuwung-Gajerrong Case) (2002) 213 CLR 1, [961] (‘The provisions of the 
Constitution are not to be read in conformity with international law. It is an 
anachronistic error to believe that the Constitution, which was drafted and adopted by 
the people of the colonies well before international bodies such as the United Nations 
came into existence, should be regarded as speaking to the international community.’) 
(footnotes omitted). For Kirby J’s own views on originalism as applied in Australia, 
see Justice M Kirby, ‘Constitutional Interpretation and Original Intent: A Form of 
Ancestor Worship?’ (2000) 24 Melbourne University Law Review 1.  
91  (1997) 190 CLR 513. 
92  Australian Constitution s 51(xxxi). 
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international law.’ 93  By drawing attention to custom, he appeared to 
enthusiastically embrace a new source of law, binding on domestic legal decision-
makers, including constitutional interpreters.  
Although the rhetoric of Kirby J’s judgment in Newcrest Mining encapsulates 
an internationalist standpoint, it is worth pointing out that the right to property is a 
controversial provision from which to launch the interpretive principle, at least 
from the perspective of an international lawyer. As Kristin Walker has noted, the 
right to property in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is reflected in 
neither the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, nor the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 94  It may 
therefore serve as a more doubtful statement of custom than other provisions of the 
Universal Declaration, despite the association of property rights with the 
fundamental principles of common law. Concerns about the status of the right to 
property as custom would be less troublesome for a worldly or constitutionalist 
judge, as described below. 
Nevertheless, the internationalist orientation continued in Kirby J’s later 
invocations of the interpretive principle. For example, in Re Colonel Aird; Ex parte 
Alpert, Kirby J stated his support for the ‘enlargement of the international rule of 
law, to which municipal, regional and international law together contribute’. 95  
‘The decisions of national courts … contribute to the content of public international 
law, as the Statute of the International Court of Justice recognises. In making such 
decisions …, municipal courts exercise a form of international jurisdiction’. 96  
This, for Kirby J, extends not only to cases in which domestic judges are deciding 
matters of international law, but to domestic law, and to the Constitution: ‘it makes 
little sense to acknowledge such obligations in connection with other municipal 
laws but to deny them when it comes to the national constitution’.97 Moreover, in 
pointing to the necessity of upholding the internationalist enterprise, he suggested 
that ‘[i]gnoring international law’ could lead to ‘chaos and futility’.98 Citing an 
opinion issued from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, he proposed 
that a judge who was unconcerned by ‘conceptions of the world in which the 
Constitution operates’, and particularly by ‘universal principles of international 
law’, would be ‘“act[ing]  on a blinkered view and … wield[ing] power divorced 
from responsibility”’.99 This position reflects a strong commitment to consider the 
international audience that Kirby J suggests is contemplated by the Australian 
Constitution.  
                                            
93  Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 513. 
94  See Walker, above n 13, 12; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3; International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, 999 UNTS 171. 
95  Re Colonel Aird; Ex parte Alpert (2004) 220 CLR 308, 345.  
96  Ibid. 
97  Ibid. 
98  Ibid. 
99  Ibid, citing ICTR-97-20-A (Decision of 31 May 2000), [25] (Judge Shahabuddeen).  
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Other judges around the world have similarly invoked international law as a 
body of binding law. One commentator, describing the ‘creeping monism’ that she 
observed in many systems in which judges considered international law in 
interpreting historically dualist common law, described Kirby J as ‘one of the 
strongest proponents’ of the monist-oriented approach, 100  Although local 
observers of Kirby J’s approach would probably disagree with this description, it is 
remarkable that an Australian justice, presiding in a local community so heavily 
committed to dualism, was characterized as taking the lead.101 The dynamics of 
internationalism have played out differently elsewhere. In Canada, the presumption 
of conformity with international law has operated to inform the protection of the 
constitutional rights entrenched in the Charter of Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms. For example, as early as 1987, Chief Justice Dickson held that ‘the 
Charter should generally be presumed to provide protection at least as great as that 
afforded by similar provisions in international human rights documents which 
Canada has ratified.’102  
Strict internationalism has not always been consistent with fundamental rights. 
In the later Canadian case of United States v Cotrioni, Justice La Forest, writing for 
the majority, held that the operation of Canada’s extradition treaties justified a 
limitation on the citizen’s right to remain in Canada, emphasising conformity, 
reciprocity and international cooperation over the Charter’s mobility rights.103 The 
decision was criticised as reversing ‘international law’s status as the soft, naturalist 
support for entrenched constitutional reform … [to] the hard-bitten, positivist 
counterweight to rights-oriented activism’.104
The internationalist orientation therefore prioritises the fact of compliance over 
the content of law and ratified treaties over other examples of supranational — and 
‘suprapositive’105 — laws, such as the European Convention on Human Rights (to 
which Australia is not party and yet which informs much of the jurisprudence of 
the United Nations committees which operate in respect to many of the human 
                                            
100  M A Waters, ‘Creeping Monism: The Judicial Trend toward Interpretive Incorporation 
of Human Rights Treaties’ (2007) 107 Columbia Law Review 628, 684. 
101  Cf H Charlesworth, ‘The High Court on Constitutional Law: The 2004 Term’ (2005) 
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(invoking the right to work under the ICESCR).  
103  United States v Cotrioni [1989] 1 SCR 1469, 1486; Cf Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, s 6(1).  
104  E Morgan, ‘In the Penal Colony: Internationalism and the Canadian Constitution’ 
(1999) 49  University of Toronto Law Journal 447, 448. But see now United States v 
Burns [2001] 1 SCR 283. For a recent consideration, in the counter-terrorism context, 
compare Suresh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [2002] 1 SCR 3; 
with Charkaoui v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) [2007] SCC 9. 
105  G L Neuman, ‘Human Rights and Constitutional Rights: Harmony and Dissonance’ 
(2003) 55 Stanford Law Review 1863 (distinguishing between three aspects of legal 
rights across both domains of law: their consensual, supra-positive, and institutional 
characteristics). 
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rights treaties to which Australia is party). It can be criticised, on the one hand, for 
straining out many of the sources of authority informing the United Nations system 
as a whole. On the other, it exerts the pressure of ‘empire’ described above, tying 
the Constitution to the set of instruments ratified by the Australian government. 
Despite his celebration of the international rule of law in Re Colonel Aird; Ex 
parte Alpert, Kirby J’s internationalism is tempered by an acceptance of a 
hierarchy in values in international law, which does not treat all of its parts as 
positivist equal.106 Human rights may occupy a special place in this hierarchy. 
Moreover, in his illuminating exchange with McHugh J in Al-Kateb v Godwin, 
Kirby J insisted that it was not ‘rules’, but rather ‘principles’, that guided his 
approach. ‘They do not bind as other “rules” do. But the principles they express 
can influence legal understanding’.107  
Nonetheless, this influence is not a flexible one: Kirby J went further than 
simply understanding the consideration of international law as permitted under the 
Constitution. He suggested, instead, an obligation: ‘national constitutional courts 
such as this, have a duty, so far as possible, to interpret their constitutional texts in 
a way that is generally harmonious with the basic principles of international law, 
including as that law states human rights’.108 Where does this duty come from? 
Given that our Constitution, unlike prominent counter-examples, contains no 
requirement that its interpreters consider international law,109 one source of the 
duty is international law. It is both the existence of this duty, and its sourcing in 
international law, that marks the internationalist position. It sets it apart from the 
position of worldliness, which does not see the consideration of international law 
as obligatory; and the position of constitutionalism, which accepts a duty to 
consider international law, but derives it from constitutionalist principles.  
(b) The Worldly Judge  
The worldly judge views more information as better than less, and brings an 
inquisitiveness to the use of international law as an interpretive guide. The idea 
behind this approach is that judges are served in their capacity of resolving disputes 
by learning from others, especially from others in a similarly aligned adjudicative 
role. For the worldly judicial posture, there are no strict rules or hierarchies of 
various jurisdictions or various rules. There may be a sense that some jurisdictions, 
                                            
106  This position is shared by those who assert a normative hierarchy in international law, 
with fundamental human rights exerting an influence as jus cogens.  
107  Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562, 624 (Kirby J). 
108  Ibid. 
109  In South Africa, the Constitution mandates the court to consider international law, and 
recommends it to consider comparative law, when interpreting the Bill of Rights: s 39 
(‘When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum - 1. must promote the 
values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality 
and freedom; 2. must consider international law; and 3. may consider foreign law.’). 
See also ss 231–33 (outlining the application of international law). For the 
comparative value of this example, see D Hovell and G Williams, ‘A Tale of Two 
Systems: The Use of International Law in Constitutional Interpretation in Australia 
and South Africa’ (2005) 29 Melbourne University Law Review 95. 
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and some sources of international law are more accessible, or more reliable, or 
more roughly relevant. But there is nothing stronger than this to guide the use of 
international law. It is a parallel source to academic opinion on the subject, but has 
the added benefit of representing an opinion formed in the context of real-world 
responsibility.110
The nation-state has disaggregated into different functions and branches, with 
the relationships between each branch — the executive, the legislature, and the 
judiciary — opening up to foreign counterparts and influence. For judges, this map 
of relationships inspires a global community of courts,111 a worldwide stage on 
which they publish their opinions, share professional insights, make collegial 
friendships, and perhaps become famous. That world, indeed, has become smaller: 
with the help of internet data-bases, judicial conferences and judicial email list-
serves, judges can access and evaluate each other’s work with speed and ease. The 
formal citation of foreign opinions is one way in which to publicise and cement this 
relationship. 
The approach of the worldly judge explicitly places international law on the 
same level of importance as comparative domestic law. The binding nature of the 
international instrument is rendered largely irrelevant and thus regional treaties that 
are non-binding elsewhere, such as the European Convention on Human Rights, 
are included within the range of sources to be considered. International trends and 
foreign decisions not yet proven as custom are given equivalent weight to ratified 
treaties and customary international law. Indeed, it matters little if a foreign 
decision was issued in dissent, or has been overturned by subsequent 
jurisprudence.112
For Kirby J, the Constitution, ‘like all other law in Australia, now operates in a 
context profoundly affected by international law. Context is always a vital 
consideration in deriving legal rules.’ 113  Thus, he suggested, in this century, 
‘national final courts must accommodate the global context in which municipal 
law, including constitutional law, has its operation. The proliferation of 
international law, especially in the last three decades, demands [its consideration 
by] this Court’. Citing authority from the United States, he suggested that 
Australians cannot have ‘trade and commerce in world markets and international 
                                            
110  Jackson, above n 1, 118 (describing this with respect to the use of comparative law); 
see also V Jackson, ‘Transnational Challenges to Constitutional Law: Convergence, 
Resistance, Engagement’ (2007) 35 Federal Law Review 161. 
111  Slaughter, above n 44; See also A Slaughter, A New World Order (2004). 
112  This is an interesting phenomenon for the new plurality thesis. For example, in South 
Africa, the Constitutional Court has considered the decisions of the US Supreme Court 
— decisions issued over 40 years ago — as most relevant to its interpretation of free 
expression; ignoring subsequent US jurisprudence on the subject. See, eg, Du Plessis v 
De Klerk 1996 (3) SA 850 (citing New York Times v Sullivan, 376 US 254, 265 (1964) 
(Justice William Brennan)).  
113  Re Colonel Aird; Ex parte Alpert (2004) 220 CLR 308, 345. 
48 Australian Year Book of International Law Vol 28 
waters exclusive on our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in our 
courts’.114  
This global awareness is also reflected in judicial attitudes elsewhere. In 1989, 
Chief Justice William Rehnquist of the United States Supreme Court suggested that 
the time had come, with the grounding of constitutional courts created after the 
Second World War, for United States courts to ‘begin looking to the decisions of 
other constitutional courts to aid in their own deliberative process’.115 Justice Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg, for example, argued with respect to the use of foreign law in the 
interpretation of the United States Constitution, that the practice resembled a 
process of ‘sharing with and learning from others’;116 a practice in which those 
who resist were the ‘losers’. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor suggested that jurists in 
other places, ‘who have given thought to the same difficult issues that we face 
here’ could teach American judges much about their own law.117
One value of worldliness lies in reciprocal engagement — as judges consider 
the opinions of their colleagues elsewhere, they bestow prestige — and a form of 
informal authority — to those ideas. Justice Kirby has been a vocal participant in 
this exercise, opening up the practice of Australian courts, and himself being cited 
in return. For example, when the Delhi High Court read down a provision of the 
Indian Penal Code which had penalised ‘unnatural offenses’, and interpreted the 
provision to exclude consensual sex between adults in private, Chief Justice Ajit 
Prakash Shah cited Kirby’s comments on the subject, alongside broader Australian 
legislative practice, and the decisions of other courts.118  
Nonetheless, while consensus may be fostered on an issue elsewhere, 
worldliness may have the opposite result within the local system. Hilary 
Charlesworth warns, for example, that the regular appearance of international law 
in Kirby J’s dissenting opinions, often invoked as a subsidiary source for a reason 
reached by other means, and appearing without comment or engagement by other 
                                            
114  Ibid, citing The Bremen v Zapata Off-Shore Co, 407 US 1, 9 (1971). 
115  Chief Justice W H Rehnquist, ‘Constitutional Courts — Comparative Remarks’ (1989) 
reprinted in P Kirchhof and D Kommers (eds), Germany and its Basic Law: Past, 
Present and Future — A German American Symposium (1993) 411, 412.  
116  Justice R B Ginsburg, ‘Looking beyond Our Borders: The Value of a Comparative 
Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication’ (2004) 22 Yale Law and Policy Review 
329.  
117  Justice S D O’Connor, Keynote Address, Ninety-Sixth Annual Meeting of the 
American Society of International Law, March 16, 2002, in (2002) 96 American 
Society of International Legal Procedure 348, 350.  
118  Naz Foundation v Union of India, (2009) WP(C) No 7455/2001, [85] citing the Hon. 
M Kirby, ‘Homosexual Law Reform: An Ongoing Blind Spot of the Commonwealth 
of Nations’, 16th National Commonwealth Law Conference, Hong Kong, 8 April 
2009. See also Naz Foundation v Union of India, (2009) WP(C) No 7455/2001, [57], 
citing Lawrence v Texas, 539 US 558 (2003) (US), and [58] citing decriminalization of 
sodomy in most Australian states by 1982, and later in Tasmania as a result of the 
decision of the United Nations Human Rights Committee in Toonen v Australia, 
Communication No. 488/1992, U.N. Doc CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (1994). 
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members of the High Court, intensifies the “already marginalized image [of 
international law] in the Australian legal system”.119
Perhaps the overarching difficulty to the worldly use of international law is the 
danger of vacuum articulated above — as judges open up to the world, and as that 
world is growing in complexity and scope, what operates to constrain the judicial 
role? Why should a decision from the European Court of Human Rights be 
considered more persuasive than caselaw from Zimbabwe?120 The question seems 
to demand a more substantive answer than merely pointing to the importance of 
‘worldliness’. Similarly, why should the rights of homosexual people to engage in 
consensual sex, or prisoners to avoid the death penalty, or asylum-seekers to avoid 
indefinite detention, or Aboriginal people to have guaranteed access to land, all 
seem to call for an internationalised standpoint of consideration, while other 
matters of law do not? One answer to these inevitable questions is provided by the 
constitutionalist position. 
(c) The Constitutionalist Judge  
A third justification for recourse to international law, which is also found in the 
justifications employed by Kirby J, and which I contend lies somewhere between 
the presumption of conformity and its informative value, is a particular moral 
commitment to international human rights law. It is this sub-category of 
international law that purports to reflect the fundamental characteristics of the 
human condition. According to the constitutionalist position, the Constitution must 
be interpreted in line with the inherent dignity and equal worth of all citizens, as 
articulated in part, in human rights instruments. The gravity and importance of this 
task is justification in itself for allowing external values to intrude into the domestic 
realm.121  International law is relevant because its practitioners have, at certain 
points in time, strived to include a statement of universal norms, to which the 
Constitution necessarily gives weight. 122  This is the balance expressed in the 
Bangalore Principles.123  
This aspect of justification is elaborated in two of Kirby J’s dissenting opinions, 
first in Kartinyeri, and later in Al-Kateb v Godwin. In the former, he held that the 
                                            
119  Charlesworth, ‘The High Court on Constitutional Law’, above n 101, 5. Compare with 
the expectation that Kirby J’s use of international human rights law would encourage 
other (Australian) judges to ‘accept the responsibility they have to protect human 
rights’: L Johns, ‘Justice Kirby, Human Rights and the Exercise of Judicial Choice’, 
27 (2001) Monash University Law Review 290, 318. 
120  Justice Breyer had cited a Zimbabwean opinion to support his view in Knight v 
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Conversation with Scalia and Breyer, above n 89. 
121  Bahdi, Globalization of Judgment, above n 86, 569.  
122  For a description of the normatively charged moment of global politics at the adoption 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the way in which its drafters 
understood themselves to be striving for universal acceptance, see K G Young, 
‘Freedom, Want, and Economic and Social Rights: Frame and Law’ 24 (2009) 
Maryland Journal of International Law 182, 182–84, 186. 
123  See text accompanying n 21, above. 
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‘races power’ in the Constitution does not extend to laws that are detrimental, or 
discriminatory, on racial grounds. He suggested that:  
where the Constitution is ambiguous, this Court should adopt the meaning which 
conforms to the principles of universal and fundamental rights rather than an 
interpretation which would involve a departure from such rights.124   
He cited Cooke P, then-President of the New Zealand Court of Appeal, who 
advocated the use of international law in constitutional interpretation ‘in light of 
the universality of human rights’,125 as well as other judicial opinions supportive 
of fundamental rights. 
Where there is ambiguity, there is a strong presumption that the Constitution, 
adopted and accepted by the people of Australia for their government, is not 
intended to violate fundamental human rights and human dignity.126  
Similarly, in Al-Kateb v Godwin, Kirby J (concurring with Gleeson CJ and 
Gummow J on this point), regarded the statute in question as ambiguous with 
respect to the detention of those whose removal from Australia was not reasonably 
practicable in the foreseeable future, and therefore construed it as subject to the 
presumption that the legislature did not intend to abrogate or curtail certain human 
rights or freedoms. Although he applied the presumption only to the legislation, 127 
Kirby J suggested in obiter that the Constitution, which applies to all Australian 
lawmakers, and the statutory and common law, are all subject to the terms of 
international human rights law. This is the application of the universalist aspect of 
his position: ‘such rights and freedoms express the common rights of all humanity. 
They pre-existed their formal expression.’128  
Within these terms, Kirby J was expressing a higher law, akin to natural law, 
for its distinctive connection with justice.129 He cited the infamous U.S. slavery 
decision in 1857, in which the dissenting opinions of McLean J and Curtis J 
invoked international law to support the proposition that Dred Scott was not a slave 
but a free man. 
Had the interpretive principle prevailed at that time, the United States Supreme 
Court might have been saved a serious error of constitutional reasoning; and much 
injustice, indifference to human indignity and later suffering might have been 
avoided. The fact is that it is often helpful for national judges to check their own 
                                            
124  Kartinyeri v Commonwealth (1998) 195 CLR 337, 411 (s 51(xxvi)). 
125  Tavita v Minister of Immigration [1994] 2 NZLR 257, 266, cited in Kartinyeri v 
Commonwealth (1998) 195 CLR 337, 417 (Kirby J). 
126  Kartinyeri v Commonwealth (1998) 195 CLR 337, 418. 
127  Only Gummow J expressed his explicit disagreement with the view that a potentially 
indefinite detention of non-citizens by the executive would be compatible with Ch III 
of the Constitution, with Gleeson CJ and Kirby J not deciding: Al-Kateb v Godwin 
(2004) 219 CLR 562, 609 [127]. 
128  Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562, 634 [176]. 
129  For a similar position, see Gerhardy v Brown (1985) 159 CLR 70, 125 (Brennan J); 
But see Kruger v Commonwealth (‘Stolen Generations Case’) (1997) 190 CLR 1. For 
a critique of the earlier case, see Johns, ‘Human Rights in the High Court of 
Australia’, above n 13. 
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constitutional thinking against principles expressing the rules of a ‘wider 
civilization’.130  
This justification gives a special, ‘suprapositive’ significance to international 
law: it is a source of law which enjoys both natural law and positive law 
credentials. The justification understands international law as ‘the law of nations’ 
which reflects a consensus in legal systems over the most complex — if basic — 
aspects of justice and injustice, and of right and wrong. Jeremy Waldron, in his 
suggestive exploration of a ‘modern’ ius gentium, traced this use of consensus to 
Roman law, in which the judge had regard to the laws of nations (or at least those 
nations with immigrants in Rome). The traditional ius gentium evolved to link 
reason with what law had actually achieved. Thus, the early usage of ius gentium 
developed into a role similar to equity — ‘a method of cutting through layers of 
local technicalities and idiosyncrasies to get at the essence of justice’.131 Later, 
international law began to develop independently, creating a more marked 
distinction between domestic and international law in the twentieth century. This 
distinction has again blurred due to the instruments and institutions of international 
human rights law. 132  This practice therefore draws explicit attention to the 
constitutionalist learning that took place after the Second World War, and to the 
international institutions that have been established.133
Something similar is proposed in Kirby J’s constitutionalist justifications — 
indeed Kirby J might represent what Waldron cannot find on the present United 
States Supreme Court — a real-life practitioner to prove his theory.134 Why do I 
term this position a constitutionalist, rather than a ‘universalist’, approach?135 I 
suggest that the emergence of the instruments and institutions of human rights 
lends force to a distinctively constitutionalist mode of reasoning about rights and 
justice. This reasoning is analogous to scientific inquiry. Waldron suggests that 
judges relying on foreign law are engaging the problem-solving component of law. 
Together, they check results, duplicate experiments, credential useful findings, and 
forge ahead with knowledge about the difficult issues of human organisation that 
are mediated by law — how we should live together, what we should owe to each 
other, and the like.  
Constitutionalism is the branch of practical knowledge that works to 
disentangle these issues through law. In particular, it is the working out of a higher 
                                            
130  Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562, 629 [190], citing Dred Scott v Sandford, 60 
US 393 (1867).  
131  J Waldron, ‘Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium’ (2005) 119 Harvard Law 
Review 129, 134.  
132  Ibid 135.  
133  Justice Breyer has valued the method because ‘foreign nations have become 
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134  Waldron, above n 131, 146.  
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law that enables and constrains self-government by counteracting the force of 
domestic majorities. This includes majorities, represented by legislatures, who have 
allowed laws to be passed, unchallenged, that abrogate fundamental rights. It also 
includes majorities within final courts, who have allowed laws to stand, 
unchallenged, that abrogate fundamental rights. It is relevant, in this latter respect, 
that an interpretation of the Constitution issued in dissent maintains its importance, 
despite consistent rejection by other judges. On this view, it is the Constitution, not 
the judgments, which allows judges to retain their fidelity to law in future cases: 
‘The task’, as one High Court justice put it, is ‘to apply the Constitution, not the 
judicial decision’.136  
The constitutionalist position is one which, compatibly with the style of 
scientific inquiry, encourages critique. When Fleur Johns examined the operation 
of human rights in the High Court of Australia between 1976 and 2003, she found 
that rights discourse had not resulted in any greater substantive concern for people 
who are vulnerable or disenfranchised in Australian law and society.137 Evaluating 
the discourse of human rights with pragmatist tools,138 Johns suggested that rights-
arguments had involved, in Australia, a complacent veneration of the law, with 
limited ‘progressive’ effects. 139  Instead, human rights in Australia, sourced 
internationally or comparatively or otherwise, had crowded out other styles of 
argument, positively demobilized claimant groups, and seen the High Court 
justices ‘endlessly polishing rather conventional dance steps, tinkering with the 
institutional choreography, and quibbling sotto voce about judicial activism’.140   
Johns’ examination suggests an uneven protection of rights in the High Court, 
even in cases whose outcomes represent litigation victories. Johns takes this fact as 
one which should recommend different strategies and discourses for people 
experiencing vulnerability or disenfranchisement in the Australian legal system. 
We might alternatively take this fact as one pointing to the immense difficulty of 
articulating a discourse of legal and political emancipation: a difficulty with which 
rights, no less than other discourses, must contend. What is special about rights, 
and why so many resources and energies remain committed to them in Australia, is 
an important question, which the constitutionalist standpoint takes seriously. Part 
of this seriousness comes from the international audiences that rights arguments 
attract, as well as the international lessons that can be drawn. Moreover, the 
                                            
136  Buck v Bavone (1976) 135 CLR 110, 137 (Murphy J). The role of stare decisis has 
always been complicated in relation to constitutional law: a fuller discussion of this 
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137  Johns, ‘Human Rights in the High Court of Australia’, above n 13, 294.  
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success of rights arguments in Australia, from indigenous rights to women’s rights 
to human rights, is not to be judged solely by the ability of representatives to win 
local court-room victories or even to achieve favourable rhetoric in judicial 
opinions.141 And while the lack of receptivity to human rights, both in the current 
High Court and in other branches of government, may point to a present 
remoteness of constitutionalism in Australia, it does not discount its future role — 
whether first through advancement, or first through retreat — in shifting the terms 
of legal and political debate.142    
Returning to the way in which judges rely explicitly on international human 
rights, it is the constitutionalist position, more than internationalism or worldliness, 
that provides the most coherent support for the tendency to appeal to a new 
plurality. Indeed, the inversion of local judicial majorities may be more consistent 
with constitutionalism, than the inversion of legislative majorities. There is nothing 
that, in principle, combines constitutionalism with an expansion of judicial 
review.143 In particular legal and political cultures, the use of international law — 
and particularly, international human rights law — may be more consistently 
confined to the development of common law, or the interpretation of statutes, 
including statutory bills of rights. In this respect, Parliament may be given the final 
word in deciding to protect rights, and may be empowered to override judicial 
interpretations of the common law or of any statute. There may be a heavy political 
cost in doing so, but one that does not sound in further judicial action.  
I suggest that it is in these two respects — in construing legislation and the 
common law consistently with fundamental human rights — that Kirby J’s 
interpretive principle — and indeed, the constitutionalist justification for his 
interpretive principle — will have the greatest impact in Australian law, at least in 
the near future. International law has already played a significant role in both. It 
was famously present in Mabo v Queensland (No 2), when Justice Brennan 
invoked the principle of non-discrimination in the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, and noted that ‘international law is a legitimate and important 
influence on the development of the common law, especially when international 
law declares the existence of universal human rights’.144 When the High Court 
determined the contours of a right to publicly founded counsel in Australia in 
Dietrich v The Queen, Chief Justice Mason and Justice McHugh suggested that the 
use of international law may present a ‘common-sense’ approach to common law 
development, and cited Justice Kirby’s earlier deployment as an example.145 There 
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continue to be important statements that link the common law presumption that 
Parliament will not abrogate fundamental human rights with international human 
rights principle.146 Moreover, as the final court of appeal with jurisdiction over 
both constitutional and non-constitutional matters, constitutional law and the 
common law are always in close proximity in the practice of the High Court.147  
Nonetheless, there are certain ‘idiosyncratic’ obstacles to the 
‘constitutionalization’ of the common law,148  in part because of the way the text 
and structure of our written Constitution have been understood as covering the 
field on the constitutionalist aspects of the relationship between government and 
individual.149  When the legislature explicitly seeks to override fundamental rights, 
the common law is a weak instrument, even if its development is informed by 
international human rights. Those justices who would have avoided the terrible 
result in Al-Kateb v Godwin, a result which means that it is possible for the 
Australian government to indefinitely detain an individual, were in the minority, 
and were forced to read the legislation in careful and perhaps constrained terms.150 
There is a greater hope, perhaps, from legislative bills of rights, which present a 
different balance between judges and legislatures than simple common law 
interpretation. 
Indeed, in the new legislative bills of rights in the Australian Capital Territory 
and Victoria, international human rights law is proving to be an important source of 
principle. In the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT), section 31 invites the 
consideration of international law in interpreting human rights, especially where 
there are clear advantages in doing so, and where the material is accessible to the 
public. This has been construed to include sources from the European Court of 
Human Rights, which are regarded as worthy of respect because of the universality 
of human rights.151 In the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 
(Vic), section 32 permits recourse to international human rights law in statutory 
interpretation, including the provisions of the Charter. Other principles of 
interpretation, such as taking context and purpose into account, the presumption of 
conformity with international obligations, and the principle of legality, are also 
held to be relevant to this exercise. 152  Unsurprisingly, debates about a new 
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legislative bill of rights at the federal level have also drawn on international and 
comparative legal examples. 153  Ultimately, the fact that constitutionalism is 
evolving to incorporate a more global standpoint, 154  links the constitutionalist 
judge with both the worldly and the internationalist positions. 
VI.  Conclusion  
In one of his last judicial words on the subject, Kirby J defiantly declared that his 
interpretive principle was just one more inevitable step in the process of evolution 
of the Australian Constitution. 155  One need not subscribe to an overarching 
narrative of progress to agree.156 Majorities abroad can bolster minorities here, 
given the judicial preference for persuasion and reason. Moreover, majorities 
abroad can exert an indirect pressure on Australian judges,157 because of three 
anomalies that are produced if international law is ignored. First, the gap between 
international and comparative law is closing. Judges who consider comparative 
law, but refuse to consider international law, may find themselves relying on the 
jurisprudence of courts which are themselves borrowing busily from international 
sources. Second, the gap between common law and constitutional law is not fixed, 
particularly given the view taken in Australian law that they are closely proximate 
areas of law. Third, the trend in some Australian states and territories towards 
legislative bills of rights has opened up those sources of law to international human 
rights, and to the stream of international authority, with which the High Court will 
inevitably become more versed.  
If Kirby J’s interpretive principle is ultimately accepted by the High Court, we 
do not know which position will be emphasised — whether it will be 
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations General Assembly: 
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154  See text accompanying n 60 above.    
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156  For a criticism of this narrative of ‘progress’, see Johns, ‘Human Rights in the High 
Court’, above n 13, 317 (describing Brennan J’s recourse to international and 
comparative texts, in order to ascertain the protection afforded, over time, to racial 
minorities). Yet the fact that law advances and retreats is acknowledged by the 
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internationalism, worldliness, or constitutionalism. Yet there are clues. The 
internationalist position is unlikely to be adopted, because of the normative and 
institutional questions raised in tying the fate of the Constitution to international 
law. The position of worldliness is more likely, as Australian judges take part in the 
transjudicial conversation and treat international law as no more threatening than, 
and just as useful as, comparative law. The position of constitutionalism, based 
heavily on the protection of international human rights, may be spurred first by 
developments in the common law and in legislative protections of rights, within 
Australia’s states and territories and, possibly, federally.  
Marking the new millennium (and the first century of the Australian 
Constitution), Justice Kirby suggested that, in former times, ‘we saw issues and 
problems through the prism of a village or nation state, especially if we were 
lawyers. Now we see the challenges of our time through the world’s eye’.158 He 
regularly explored, in his extrajudicial contributions, global advances, such as in 
technology, transport and trade, and global problems, such as pandemics, climate 
change and overpopulation.159 Yet Kirby J’s world was a judicial world. He saw 
the world through the judge’s eye — and it was not as a distant planet. Instead, he 
saw a world of laws, a world of opinions, and a world of rights and wrongs that, 
while indeed encircling the globe, are still very much a part of it.  
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